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e-Reputation: Building Trust in Electronic Commerce

Susan Block-Lieb*
Who would place a bid in an online auction in which a stranger,
identified only by pseudonym, offers to sell an object based on a
brief written description and a grainy digital photograph? Why
would any set of strangers engage in commerce over the Internet,
whether retail, wholesale or tag sale? If something goes wrong in
the electronic transaction, legal redress may be problematic.
Where e-commerce involves small dollar amounts or transaction
partners in distant or foreign jurisdictions, breach is unlikely to be
followed by litigation since litigation may be too time-consuming,
expensive, or unpredictable.
The academic community has long understood that, while
clearly articulated legal rules and predictable legal enforcement of
those rules enhance commercial transactions, commerce can occur,
and may even flourish, in their absence. Commercial norms can
supplement commercial law,' while verification institutions2 and
non-legal sanctions3 supplement judicial enforcement of that law.
Moreover, traders can manage the risks that underlie commercial
transactions by acquiring information about others' reputation in
the market,4 but "relying only on direct personal experience is both
inefficient and perilous: inefficient, because any one individual
will be limited in the number of exchange partners she or he has,
and perilous, because one will discover untrustworthy partners
only through hard experience." 5 As a result, markets have
Copyright 2002, by LOUIsIANA LAW REVIEW.
Professor of Law, Fordham Law School. Many thanks to the participants
in the LSU Law School Symposium on Unifying Commercial Law and the
Fordham Law School Legal Theory Workshop for their coments and
encouragement.
1. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry:
Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 Mich. L. Rev.
1724 (2001); Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the
Code's Searchfor Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1765 (1996).
2. Ronald J. Mann, Verification Institutions in Financing Transactions, 87
Geo. L. J. 2225 (1999) [hereinafter "Mann, Verification Institutions"]; Ronald J.
Mann, Information Technology and Non-Legal Sanctions in Financing
Transactions, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 1627 (2001) [hereinafter "Mann, Information
Technology"].
3. David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in CommercialRelationships, 104 Harv.
L. Rev. 373 (1990).
4. See, e.g., Lewis A. Kornhauser, Reliance, Reputation, and Breach of
Contract, 26 J.L. & Econ. 691 (1983).
5. Peter Kollock, The Production of Trust in Online Markets at 3, in 16
Advances in Group Processes (Edward J. Lawler, et al eds. 1999).
*
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developed mechanisms6 for sharing and selling reputation
information.7
In ReputationandIntermediariesin ElectronicCommerce,8 Clayton
P. Gillette considers whether reputation intermediaries and reputation
sanctions offer plausible substitutes for contractual enforcement in ecommerce, 9 and focuses his attention on the performance of feedback
forums like that provided by eBay, the largest online auction. 0 In the
end, he is skeptical that the eBay feedback forum can provide
customers with a reliable means for transmitting accurate information
about traders' commercial reputation and sanctioning those who do
6. Reputation intermediaries do not present the only method for resolving
online traders' reluctance to engage in e-commerce. Law reform, particularly
reform efforts geared toward the adoption of bright-line statutory provisions to
govern e-commerce transactions, can assist in fostering trust in electronic
commerce. See, e.g., Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act, available
online at www.ucitaonline.com. Online non-judicial dispute resolution mechanisms
can also encourage traders to engage in e-commerce.
See, e.g.,
www.squaretrade.com; www.BBBonline.com; and www.ombuds.org. Polls
consistently show consumers' greatest concern regarding electronic commerce
pertains to issues of privacy. See, e.g., Princeton Survey Research Associates, A
Matterof Trust. What Users Wantfrom Web Sites; Results ofa NationalSurvey of
Internet Users for Consumer Web Watch (Jan. 2002), available at
www.consumerwebwatch.org. For a discussion of regulation and self-regulation
of users' rights to privacy, see Lynn Chuang Kramer, Comment, PrivateEyes Are
Watching You: Consumer Online Privacy Protection-LessonsFrom Home and
Abroad, 37 Tex. Int'l L. J. 387 (2002); Panel Discussion, Internet PrivacyLaw,
PolicyandPractice:State,FederalandInternationalPerspectives,54 Me. L. Rev.
95 (2002); William McGeveran, Note, ProgrammedPrivacy Promises:P3Pand
Web PrivacyLaw, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1812 (2001).
7. See, e.g., Mann, Information Technology, supranote 2, at 1637-44; Mann,
Verification Institutions,. supra2, at 2252-57; Charny, supra note 3, at 408-420;
Werner Raub & Jeroen Weesie, Reputation andEfficiency in Social Interactions:
An Example ofNetwork Effects, 96 Am. J. Soc. 626 (1990); Anatol Rapoport et al.,
Experiments with Social Traps IV: Reputation Effects in the Evolution of
Cooperation,7 Rationality & Society 431 (1995).
8. Clayton P. Gillettei Reputation and Intermediaries in Electronic
Commerce, 62 La. L. Rev. 1165 (2002).
9. Gillette, supra note 8, at 1180 (arguing that eBay feedback scores may
"not provide a complete alternative to the threat of contract enforcement as a means
of reducing distrust" online). He contends that reputation intermediaries can
provide an assurance of contractual performance and substitute for legal
enforcement in electronic commerce, even among strangers, if"(a) credible positive
and negative information about the trader is available; (b) there exists a mechanism
for communicating that information to potential trading partners; and (c) the market
in which the trader deals is sufficiently thick that potential trading partners have a
choice about the parties with whom they trade." Id. at 5. In this way, reputation
intermediaries can make lemonade in the market for information about a potential
traders' reputation for performance. Cf George Akerlof, The Marketfor Lemons:
Qualitative Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. Econ. 488 (1970)
(discussing "lemons' markets" and methods for resolving them).
10. See www.eBay.com.
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not engage in reasonable commercial conduct in online auctions."
He argues that the usefulness of a reputation system is undermined
by participants' limited capacities to verify the accuracy 12or
inaccuracy of reputation information available over the Internet.
Gillette's ambivalence about feedback forums' success stems
from the fact that only a small fraction of online traders post negative
or even neutral commentary with eBay. He suspects, not just that too
little feedback is posted, but, more damning, that participants underreport their dissatisfaction with online auctions. He raises both

theoretical and practical reasons why dissatisfied buyers and sellers
would refrain from posting negative remarks more frequently than
they would refrain from posting positive ones. Gillette is quick to
note the existence of empirical studies, such as that conducted by
Paul Resnick and Richard Zeckhauser, which show a significant

correlation between a feedback score and the likelihood that an
auction will be concluded successfully. 3 Nonetheless, Gillette
remains unconvinced by this data. He disagrees that these studies

demonstrate, as Resnick and his co-authors claim, "that reputation

systems appear to perform reasonably well" online. 4 Gillette fears
that the data show only that "successful bidders might have believed
11. Gillette, supra note 8, at 1168-69.
12. Gillette, supra note 8, at 1169 ("In this paper, I suggest that even where
participation rates are high, the quality of information may be of limited utility to
potential users of the system.").
13. More than a handful of studies conducted by economists and other social
scientists demonstrate a significant correlation between feedback score and the
likelihood that an auction will be concluded successfully, precisely the result one
would expect of a successful reputation system. Patrick Bajari & Ali Hortagsu,
Winner's Curse, Reserve Prices, and Endogenous Entry: Empirical Insightsfrom
eBay Auctions, (Jan. 10, 2001 Stanford Dept. of Economics working paper),
available at http://www_econ.stanford.edu/faculty/workp.swpOO004.pdf; Kollock,
supra note 5; Daniel Houser & John Wooders, Reputation in Internet Auctions:
Theory & Evidence from eBay,(Feb. 14, 2001 working paper) available at
http://w3.arizona.edu/-econ/workingpapers/InternetAuctions.pdf;
David
Lucking-Reiley, Doug Bryan, Naghi Prasad & Daniel Reeves, Pennies From eBay:
The Determinants ofPrice in Online Auctions, (Jan. 2000 working draft) available
at http://eller.arizona.edu/-reiley/papers/PenniesFromEBay.pdf;
Cynthia G.
McDonald & V. Carlos Slawson, Reputation in an Internet Auction Market, (Jan.
28,2000 SSRN working draft availableat http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstractid=207448; Paul Resnick & Richard Zeckhauser, Trust Among Strangers
in Internet Transactions: Empirical Analysis ofeBay 's Reputation System, (Feb.
5, 2001 working paper for review by NBER workshop participants), available at
http://www.si.umich.edu/-presnick/#publications.
14. Paul Resnick, Richard Zeckhauser, Eric Friedman & Ko Kuwabara,
Reputation Systems: Facilitating Trust in Internet Interactions, 43 Comm. ACM
45 (2000), available at http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?doid=355112.355122, at
5.
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that Feedback Forum ratings conveyed valuable information, even
though that was not the case, and even though unsuccessful visitors
more appropriately discounted the quality ofthe signal."'" According
to Gillette, traders' perception that eBay feedback forums accurately
convey reputation information, their naive faith in this reputation
mechanism, is not enough to establish eBay's success as a reputation
intermediary. 6 Resnick and Zeckhauser contest this view and instead
claim that "it is the ?erception of how the system operates, not the
facts, that matters."'
In this paper, I consider the circumstances under which an online
reputation system enables participants to deter fraud, share
information about commercial quality, and otherwise encourage
market participants to engage in electronic commerce. Part I
considers whether there exists an inherent selection bias against
negative commentary on eBay's feedback forum, as Gillette suggests.
Part II asks whether imperfect feedback forums can still "perform
reasonably well," as Resnick, Zeckhauser, and others argue, because
they employ informal mechanisms for punishing online
transgressions, at least some ofthe time. Finally, Part IIexplores the
importance of perception to electronic reputation systems and the
development of trust in e-commerce.
I.
Commerce-including electronic commerce over the
Internet-creates a sort ofPrisoner's Dilemma. Both ofus would be
better off if our bilateral performance obligations were completed,
but the temptation to shirk may preclude us from maximizing our
collective welfare. I am tempted by the thought that I will be best off
if I receive the goods or services you agreed to provide, but fail to
pay for them; you are tempted by the thought that you would be best
off if you were to pocket my payment, but deliver boxes of sawdust
rather than valuable widgets. The common law sets contract
damages at levels intended to discourage the temptation to shirk and
resolves this Prisoner's Dilemma. However, for all ofthe reasons set
out by Gillette-small transaction size; imprecise legal rules; traders
in distant, perhaps, foreign locations-legal rules may not
sufficiently deter shirking on the Internet.
In the end, e-commerce requires commercial actors to trust one
another just as trust binds commercial actors in "bricks and mortar"
marketplaces. Scholars explain that traders trust one another, in part,
15. Gillette, supranote 8, at 1189.
16. Gillette, supranote 8, at 1189-90.

17. Resnick &Zeckhauser, supranote 13, at 23 ("The system may still work,
even if it is unreliable or unsound, if its participants think it is working.").
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based upon their reputations in the marketplace. Economic actors
who conduct themselves consistent with commercial norms create
and preserve a reputation for good conduct in the marketplace. 8 A
reputable commercial actor is unlikely to shirk, not only because
there is a good chance that the trader will act as reputably in future
transactions as she has in the past, but also because the trader knows
that breach will be sanctioned in the commercial community by the
loss of her valuable reputation. Scholars predict that reputation
sanctions work best against large-sized businesses, 9 especially those
that frequently engage in similar transactions and must return to the
market with their reputations intact.2" This literature also ties the
effectiveness ofreputation sanctions to the market's ability to assess
a potential trader's reputation. Markets limited to a small,
homogeneous group of participants easily share reputation
information,2 whereas diffuse markets may only be able to share
information about a trader's reputation using technology.22
Reputation systems that utilize advanced information technology are
said to work best when they evaluate simple and objective
information23 regarding present or past occurrences.24 Where these
costs of assessment are affordable, traders can avoid "bad deals" ex
ante by evaluating the reputation of their counterparty before entering
into the transaction.
At first blush, the Internet seems especially well suited to assist
traders or their intermediaries in acquiring and broadcasting
reputation information to interested parties.2 Advanced information
storage and retrieval functions enhance potential traders' abilities to
access and manipulate the reputation information at a low cost.
Moreover, the effectiveness of reputation sanctions need not be
18. Bernstein, supra note 1.
19. Mann, VerificationInstitutions,supra note 2, at 2254-57.
20. Chamy,supranote 3, at414-15; Mann, VerificationInstitutions,supranote
2, at 2255; Mann, Information Technology, supra note 2, at 1637-44.
21. E.g., Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal
ContractualRelations in the Diamond Industry,21 J. Legal Stud. 115 (1992);

Charny, supra note 3, at 418.
22. Charny, supra note 3; Mann, supra note 2.
23. Mann, Information Technology, supranote 2, at 1636 ("If the information
is more complicated or subjective (Is this company a good investment? Is this the
best mountain-bike on the market for my needs?), information technology is less
likely to result in direct verification of the information because the costs to the
individual user of verifying the information are likely to remain higher than the
value of the information.").
24. Id. at 1635 ("Direct verification of information can be helpful in
transactions in which the information already exists at the time of the
transactions.").
25. Mann, Verification Institutions,supra note 2, at 2271-72.
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limited to geographically or culturally tight-knit commercial
communities because the information can be disseminated with ease
and little cost over the Internet.
Despite the obvious technological advantages of conducting a
reputation system over the Internet, commentators have uncovered a
number of obstacles, some theoretical and some practical. In their
paper Facilitating Trust in Internet Interactions, Paul Resnick,
Richard Zeckhauser, Eric Friedman, and Ko Kuwabara describe the
significant challenges that reputation systems face in eliciting
reputation information from participants.
First, Resnick, Zechhauser, Friedman, and Kuwabara contend that
the system must overcome collective action problems inhibiting
people from taking the time to provide any feedback.27 I am
uncertain that eBay participants face a collective action problem in
deciding whether to post feedback. Feedback imposes minimal costs
and creates a significant benefit for users, at least for those who
anticipate returning to the auction. A participant is unlikely to build
an online reputation by failing to comment on a counterparty's
conduct, and, thus, has every incentive to post. In any event, actual
practices contradict what the collective-action theory predicts. As
Gillette notes,28 empirical studies of eBay show that buyers and
26. Resnick et al., supra note 13, at 4. Resnick, Zeckhauser, Friedman, and

Kuwabara go on to describe reputation systems' difficulties, not only in eliciting
reputation information, but also in distributing and aggregating it. They argue that
the distribution of reputation information is complicated by the ability to trade
online under a pseudonym, since traders generally are not precluded from reregistering under a new pseudonym. Id. at 4-5. The ability to re-register under a
new pseudonym permits a trader to shed an undesirable reputation and re-enter the
marketplace. In the end, they view the distributional complications arising from an
ability to change pseudonyms to be limited since newcomers, having no feedback,
face the prospect of re-building their reputations. Id. Resnick and his co-authors
also argue that distribution of reputation information is also complicated by an
inability to move reputation information from one reputation system on the Internet
to another, and they point to a spat between eBay and Amazon concerning the
latter's rating-import service. Id. Finally, they contend that reputation systems face
difficulties in aggregating reputation information so that users can utilize the
cumulated data meaningfully. Id. They note that eBay calculates its feedback
scores differently than other reputation intermediaries. Id.[ ("eBay displays the net
feedback (positives minus negatives)]. Other sites such as Amazon display an
average."). See also Kollack, supranote 5. They also argue that simple numerical
reputation ratings treat all transactions as comparable, but as a result of obscure
important differences among distinct transactions, potential buyers would have a
difficult time sorting the reputations out. Resnick, et al., supra note 13, at 5.
27. Resnick, et al., supra note 13, at 4 (stating that "people may not bother to
provide feedback at all" and noting, as an example, that "when a trade is completed
successfully at eBay, there is little incentive to spend another few minutes filling
out a form").
28. Gillette, supranote 8, at 1181.
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sellers post feedback far more frequently than one would have
thought. Resnick and Zeckhauser examined a large set of eBay
transactions from February 1 to June 30, 1999,9 and found that
buyers commented on sellers for 52.1% of the items and sellers on
buyers 60.6% of the time.3° Thus, surprisingly, a higher percentage
of users post
feedback on eBay than voted in the last Presidential
3
election.
Resnick, Zeckhauser, Friedman, and Kurawara also note that it is
difficult for a reputation system to ensure that it is eliciting honest
commentary, and particularly difficult to obtain traders' negative
feedback.3 2 Gillette concurs, and goes on to argue that the
"information that eBay provides appears to be heavily skewed in a
manner that renders its utility suspect."3 3 He notes that traders
overwhelmingly post positive commentary, rather than negative or
neutral remarks, and refer's to Resnick and Zeckhauser's empirical
study of eBay transactions.34 In this study, Resnick and Zeckhauser
found that, of feedback provided by buyers, only 0.6% of the
comments were negative, 0.3% were neutral, and 99.1% were
positive;35 they also found that sellers were only slightly more likely
to post problematic comments than buyers (1.0% of sellers' feedback
29. Resnick & Zeckhauser, supranote 13, at 8-9 (describing data sets).
30. Id. at 11. Resnick and Zeckhauser suspect that users provide feedback for
three inter-related reasons:
[M]any people do it as part of some quasi-civic duty. It is an encouraged
activity, and does not cost much. Others do it as a courtesy. They have
had a successful transaction and want to say thanks. Some expect
reciprocity. Indeed, numerous sellers communicate with buyers that they
always provide feedback for a successful transaction, and they hope the
buyer will do so as well.
Id. at 5. Resnick and Zeckhauser empirically support their hunches about
reciprocity. They looked for and found considerable correlation both in the
propensity to provide feedback (sellers and buyers are more likely to provide
feedback if the other did so) and the direction of the feedback provided (for
example, sellers are positive 99.8.% of the time when the buyer is positive, but
positive only 39.3% of the time when the buyer's comments were either neutral or
negative).
Id. at 18-21.
31. The Federal Election Commission reports that 51.2% of the voting age
population cast votes for one Presidential candidate or another in the 2000 election.
FEC, 2000 Presidential Popular Vote Summary For All Candidates Listed on at
Least
One
State
Ballot
(2001),
available at
www.fec.gov/pubrec.fe2000/prespop.htm.
32. Resnick, et al., supranote 13, at 4.
33. Id. See also id. at 5 (arguing that "the potential utility of reputational
mechanisms in electronic commerce is likely to be hampered by the limited
capacity of users to confirm the data on which a reputation is formed").
34. Gillette, supra note 8, at 1181.
35. Gillette, supranote 8, at 1181; Resnick & Zeckhauser, supranote 13, at 11.
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was negative; 0.2% was neutral). 6 But the fact that eBay participants
are far more likely to post positive than either neutral or negative
remarks does not necessarily show that feedback scores are biased or
otherwise unreliable.
To support his concern that "comments suffer from a selection
bias that causes them to deviate from the actual experience of
users,"" Gillette argues that participants face incentives both to skew
their commentary toward the positive and to under-report their
negative experiences on eBay. Overall, his arguments present
convincing explanations for the high rate ofparticipation on feedback
forums; they are less convincing on the topic of bias. For example,
Gillette contends that both participants and eBay face incentives to
encourage positive commentary-participants because their online
3
reputation depends upon building a reliably strong feedback score; "
eBay because online profits depend upon expanding their base offeeParticipants'
paying users and revenue-producing auctions."
incentives to build up feedback scores and eBay's incentives to
explain to users how best to accomplish this goal both help to explain
why participants post commentary more frequently than is expected
in theory, as noted above.4' I am unconvinced, however, that an
incentive to build up a feedback score would persuade a buyer to post
positive commentary notwithstanding her seller's material breach (or
vice versa).
More than simply encourage positive commentary, Gillette also
sees disincentives to register a complaint. Resnick and Zeckhauser
attribute some positive commentary to a "high courtesy equilibrium,"
by which they mean eBay participants follow my mother's advice to
avoid commentary altogether in the absence of "something nice to
say." 4 ' Gillette sees something "more invidious" in this norm of
courtesy,42 and puts his concern in the following way:
36. Resnick & Zeckhauser, supra note 13, at 11. Resnick and Zeckhauser
describe the combination of (i) high rate of feedback and (ii) rarity of neutral or
negative feedback as a "High Courtesy Equilibrium." Resnick & Zeckhauser,
supra note 13, at 18.
37. Gillette, supra note 8, at 1180.
38. Gillette, supranote 8,at 1185 ("Repeat players Would like to have positive
reputations to induce others to deal with them, and may be willing to say good
things about others in order to elicit a similar response.").
39. Gillette, supra note 8, at 1187 (noting that eBay's instructions "invite
positive comments, but discourage negative ones").
40. Gillette, supranote 8, at 1184 ("That is, conceivably participation in the
creation of feedback constitutes a benefit to the poster rather than a cost.").
41. Resnick & Zeckhauser, supranote 13, at 18-21.
42. Gillette, supra note 8,at 1191 ("My claim, then, isthat there is something
more dubious operating than Resnick and Zeckhauser's norm of courtesy. Both
participants and eBay have incentives to skew reporting of the online auction
experience in favor ofthe positive. The true experiences ofparticipants, therefore,
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The very incentives that invite reciprocity of compliments in
order to enhance Feedback Forum ratings simultaneously
discourage negative comments that might invite retaliatory
comments that reduce one's own rating.43
But why view feedback as a zero sum game? Absent incentives to
post positive commentary, isn't it just as likely that participants
would do nothing and fail to register any remark at all with the
forum? Gillette does not explain why he presumes that a norm of
courtesy encourages users not only to participate in the feedback
forum, but also to rephrase their negative experiences in positive
terms. A buyer may be willing to hold her tongue on minor
transgressions in the hopes of exchanging positive remarks and
enhancing her feedback score, but I would be surprised if buyers
would withhold complaints of fraud or nonperformance in an effort
to build their online reputations.
If I am right, then feedback forums work best when they are most
needed. Participants forgive minor deviations in performance
obligations; they exchange platitudes and compliments as a way of
mutually building feedback scores. But when a counterparty fails to
perform altogether or, worse yet, commits fraud, I suspect that
interests in building feedback ratings and remaining polite fall to the
wayside. Here, data provide some support. Resnick and Zeckhauser
analyzed the text comments accompanying buyers' problematic
comments, and found that negative and neutral comments were used
for different sorts of complaints:
Surprisingly, items that did not match their description were
somewhat more likely to receive neutral than negative
feedback, perhaps reflecting that buyers may have thought
discrepancies were honest mistakes on the part of sellers.
Similarly, slow shipment was more likely to lead to a neutral
than negative feedback. Not following through on a sale, or
worse, not sending the item after receiving pa Tnent, tended
to yield negative rather than neutral feedback.Z
That participants reserve negative commentary for major
transgressions in the eBay community provides limited support for
are not reflected.").
43. Gillette,supranote 8,at 1185 (arguing that the "high courtesy equilibrium"
suggested by Resnick and Zeckhauser "do[es] not support the more important
requirement that feedback provide credible information about buyers and sellers"
and claiming that it instead suggests "that feedback will be skewed in favor of a
disproportionate percentage of positive reviews").

44. Resnick & Zeckhauser, supra note 13, at 11.
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the claim that users would not refrain from posting negative
commentary relating to a participants' outright failure to perform.
Additional support is found in an emerging body of scholarship that
empirically tests an actor's willingness to punish norm violators. In
this scholarship, economists report on public goods experiments
demonstrating a widespread willingness to punish shirking, "even if
punishment is costly and does not provide any material benefits for
the punisher."45
Gillette also argues that eBay participants are chilled from posting
negative experiences out of a fear that they will find themselves the
subject of retaliatory feedback. He presents a convincing case for the
notion that the potential for retaliatory commentary chills users from
registering complaints on the feedback forum, although in the end I
am skeptical that retaliation undermines the credibility of the
reputation information available on feedback forums. Both Gillette
and Resnick attribute a portion ofnegative commentary to retaliation
for earlier negative feedback.46 Focusing on the ex ante incentives
created in a retaliatory system, Gillette contends that retaliation may
chill participants from posting anything other than positive remarks.
When viewed from an ex post perspective, however, retaliation
would seem to inflate rather than diminish the number of negative
remarks posted. According to this view, some of the fact-based
negative and neutral comments are coupled with retaliatory remarks
that only feign dissatisfaction. The worst we can say is that
retaliation creates incentives for participants both to overstate and
understate their dissatisfaction.48
45. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gdichter, Cooperation and Punishment in Public
GoodsExperiments,90 Amer. Econ. Rev. 980,980 (2000)(in addition, finding "that

free-riders are punished the [sic] more heavily the more they deviate from the
cooperation levels of the cooperators"). See also Alexander Field, Altruistically
Inclined? (2000).
46. Resnick et al., supra note 13, at 4 ("One party could blackmail
another-that is, threaten to post negative feedback unrelated to actual
performance."); Gillette, supra note 8, at 1186 ("The very incentives that invite
reciprocity of compliments in order to enhance feedback forum ratings
simultaneously discourage negative comments that might invite retaliatory
comments that reduce one's own rating.").
47. Gillette, supranote 8, at 1186 (noting participants' incentives to retaliate
on the feedback forum and concluding that "[t]he potential possessor of negative
information, therefore, is unlikely to post the information").

48. False commentary posted in retaliation would not inflate the amount of

negative remarks posted in the long run if the intermediary were obliged to

investigate and correct allegations oferror. For example, credit reporting agencies
are required to investigate and correct errors in credit reports under the Fair Credit
Reporting Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681 et seq. (2001). eBay has no such commitment,
however. In describing the workings of the feedback forum, eBay substantially
limits the circumstances under which they will consider removing errant feedback
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Gillette is most convincing when he argues that the commentaryr
posted on the feedback forum is not so much skewed as it is noisy.
He is right to note that retaliatory comments muddy up the reputation
information provided to future traders who cannot "adjudicate
between the anonymous disputants in online altercations."5
Ambiguity in reports of nonperformance or fraud create concerns that
users will not be able to sort out a buyer's and seller's mutual
recriminations, and determine whether it was the buyer or seller who
behaved disreputably in the transaction.
This sort of noise should not, however, undermine the ability of
the feedback forum to self-regulate commercially disreputable
conduct, such as fraud. Faced with a noisy report in which negative
comments are exchanged, tit for tat, future users will simply try to
avoid doing business with either party, at least for a while. One of
the two may be shunned from the marketplace unjustly, but the
reputation system will have succeeded in deterring fraud and
nonperformance in the marketplace. Admittedly, noisy reputation
systems impose only rough justice, but- in the wild, wild Internet,
rough justice may be sufficient to deter commercial misconduct,
especially where numerous identical items are simultaneously
available for purchase.
Although Gillette is undoubtedly correct to note that the feedback
forum does not provide participants with a perfect substitute for
judicial enforcement,5 in making this criticism, he may ask the
from the forum. See http://pages.egay.com/help/community/fbremove.html.
Nowhere does it commit to removing inaccurate feedback. It does commit to
investigate "inappropriate trading behavior," but disciplinary action "may range
from a formal warning, up to indefinite suspension of a user's account." See
http://pages.egay.com/help/community /investigates.html. The list of "feedback
offenses" does not list "false or retaliatory feedback" as justifying investigation or
disciplinary action, although "transaction non-performance" counts are included
among the list of buyers' and sellers' offenses. Id.
49. Moreover, even where commentary is positive in tone, Gillette argues that
it lacks substantive content and may even repeat the same uninformative remark
over and again. Gillette, supranote 8, at 1182 (noting that eBay commentary "often
appear[s] to be highly routinized in ways that suggest that the poster of the
comment is making few distinctions among trading partners;" providing example
of 546 feedback comments left by Crixus saying only "A pleasure to deal with.
Thanks again").
50. Gillette, supra note 8, at 1187 ("The effect of the retaliatory threat is not
only to reduce the amount of negative information posted, but also to increase the
amount of noise in the system.").
51. Gillette, supranote 8, at 1179 ("High ratings may serve as the functional
equivalent of brand names, allowing potential traders to sort reliable from
unreliable trading partners. Nevertheless, I want to raise some questions about its
efficacy and offer some explanations for why it might not provide a full alternative
to the threat of contract enforcement as a means of reducing distrust.").
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feedback forum to do too much. 2 Resnick and Zeckhauser concede
that eBay's feedback forum, like any reputation system, does not
work perfectly. Nonetheless, they remain convinced that it works
well enough to deter fraud and engender trust in the online auction."
A discussion of their justification for this position follows in the next
sections.
II.
Although Gillette questions the reliability and utility ofreputation
mechanisms in electronic commerce, he stops short ofcondemnation,
and for good reason. It is difficult to contend that eBay's feedback
forum does not work given the volume of transactions intermediated
on eBay and given the substantial statistical research correlating
sellers' feedback scores with the success of their eBay auction
transactions.
The volume of business transacted on eBay is astounding. As of
December 2001, eBay had 42.2 million registered users.54 At any one
time, eBay.com has more than 5 million items for sale in over 18,000
specific categories." It controls more than 70% ofthe consumer-toconsumer online auction market.56 As a practical matter, the volume
of online auction business conducted on eBay signifies users' trust in
both eBay and their feedback forum.
Empirical research also provides evidence that feedback scores
affect bidding activity in eBay's online auctions. Gillette refers to
one such study when he remarks that, after examining 451 eBay
auctions for collector quality Harley-Davidson Barbie dolls, Cynthia
G. McDonald and V. Carlos Slawson found a positive relation
between price and eBay's quantified reputation measure. 57 Other
studies corroborate the correlation between auction price and eBay's
reputation score noted by McDonald and Slawson. For example,
52. With some reputation systems, an intermediary assumes an evaluative role
in order to minimize participants' confusion regarding conflicting or otherwise
complex information. See text associated with infra notes 90-91. The question is

whether eBay should be viewed as an evaluative reputation intermediary. See text
associated with infra notes 91-93.
53. Resnick &Zeckhauser, supranote 13, at 3; Resnick, et al., supra note 13,
at 5.
54.

I found these figures on the Business Week online company profile service,

availableat http://research.businessweek.com/business-summary.asp?Symbol=
EBAY.
55. Id.
56. Houser & Wooders, supra note 13, at 15.
57. Gillette, supra note 8, at 1189 ("There is some reason to doubt the

existence of a serious selection bias, notwithstanding the theoretical issues that I
have raised."), citing McDonald & Slawson, supra note 13.
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Peter Kollock conducted a similar study ofeBay and found that "[a]t
least for some high value goods, the seller's reputation had a positive
and statistically significant effect on the price buyers paid for
identical goods of equivalent quality.""8 David Lucking-Reiley and
his co-authors studied 461 eBay auctions for mint-condition Indianhead pennies.59 They found that sellers' feedback ratings have a
measurable effect on auction price. More specifically, they found
that negative feedback scores have a much greater effect than positive
feedback ratings.60 Similarly, Daniel Houser and John Wooders
found "buyers pay a statistically and economically significant
premium to sellers with better reputations. '' 61
Price is not the only indicator that reputation scores affect online
auctions, moreover. Feedback scores may also affect the probability
of sale. 62 As Gillette notes, Resnick and Zeckhauser examined both
price and probability ofsale in their study of456 listings ofRio MP3
digital audio players and 180 listings of Britannia Beanie Babies.63
They found that the relationship between sellers with higher
reputation scores and price was indeterminate, but did find a
statistically significant relationship between feedback scores and
probability of sale---"more positives and fewer negatives and neutrals
did appear to affect the probability ofsale, and in similar ways for the
two groups. 64
Gillette raises two reasons for questioning whether these
empirical studies demonstrate that the feedback forum enables buyers
to distinguish between reputable and disreputable sellers. First, he
argues that the studies show only that the prevailing bidders in eBay
auctions view high feedback scores as indicative of seller quality, but
58. Kollock, supranote 5,at 13; Peter Kollack, The ValueofReputation, (1998
UCLA working paper).
59. Lucking-Reiley, et al., supranote 13.
60. Lucking-Reiley, supranote 13, at 9 ("A 1%increase in the seller's positive
feedback ratings yields a 0.03% increase in the auction price, on average. The
effect of negative feedback ratings is much larger, and in the opposite direction: a
1% increase causes a 0.11% decrease in auction price, on average. The effect of
negative feedback is statistically significant at the 5% level, while the effect of
positive feedback is not.").
61. Houser & Wooders, supra note 13, at 3 (also examining effect of buyer
reputation on price and finding buyer reputation to be "statistically insignificant,"
consistent with their theory for high-bid auctions).
62. Resnick & Zeckhauser, supranote 13, at 15 (noting potential for reaching
a misleading result if price is studied, but not probability of sale, or vice versa).
63. Resnick & Zeckhauser, supra note 13.
64. Id. at 16 ("Doubling the number of negatives and neutrals seems to more
than cancel the effect of doubling the number of positives, which suggests that
sellers with a constant ratio of problematic feedback will be treated worse of [sic]
over time.").
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not that feedback scores are "widely accepted as accurate., 65 His
logic follows from what economists refer to as the "winner's
curse"-the notion that the bidders in an auction face incentives to
overestimate the value of the object for sale in order to win the bid,
incentives she may later regret.6 But not every auction suffers from
a winner's curse. In his book entitled "Winner's Curse," Richard
Thaler notes that it "is an empirical question whether bidders in
various contexts get it right or are cursed. 67 Patrick Bajari and Ali
Hortagsu conducted an extensive empirical study of eBay auctions
for United States mint/proof coin sets to quantify the extent of the
winner's curse on eBay,65 and found "that coins sold on eBay
auctions fetch prices that are close to their book values., 69 After
structuring a model of bidding activity, they estimated that the
winner's curse "causes bidders to lower their bids by 3.2% per
additional competitor"-assuming auctions with three bidders in
them, "this corresponds roughly to a 10% 'eBay discount."' 70 Bajari
and Hortagsu concluded that their "empirical results go against a
large 'winner's curse' effect" on eBay."
Second, Gillette argues that "even if all Feedback Forum users
believe that the ratings convey useful information," they may not
convey "an ideal amount of information."72 With this remark,
Gillette goes well beyond the initial premise of his project and trips
on a nirvana fallacy along the way. The question is not so much
whether the feedback forum constitutes an efficient market for used
and collectible goods. Instead, I understood the questions posed by
his paper to be much narrower: Do feedback forums encourage
participants to trust the Internet enough to engage in small
transactions between strangers? Do feedback forums effectively
sanction and, thus, deter online fraud? Can feedback forums provide
an informal substitute for contractual enforcement? A feedback
forum can perform these functions although it does not disseminate
"optimal information about seller reputations."73
Resnick & Zeckhauser do not search for nirvana in the feedback
forum. They instead argue that a reputation system will be effective,
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Gillette, supranote 8, at 1190.
Richard H. Thaler, The Winner's Curse 50-62 (1992).
Id. at 51.
Bajari & Hortagsu, supra note 13, at 1.
Id. at 2.

70.

Id.

71. Id. at 1.
72. Gillette, supranote 8, at 1190 ("McDonald and Slawson indicate that there
is a positive correlation between reputation and price. They do not purport to claim
that the prices that eBay auctions command is identical to the prices that would be
obtained if buyers had optimal information about seller reputations.").
73. Id.
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even if the system does not "work well in the statistical tabulation
sense," so long as it fulfills two, inter-related functions: (i) the
imposition ofan "initiation fee" on inexperienced sellers; and (ii) the
ability to "stone" sellers whose performance deviates from accepted
commercial norms.
Resnick and Zeckhauser first argue that a functioning reputation
system should permit users to impose an initiation fee on sellers in
the form of reduced prices and reduced frequency of sale/item
listed.74
By "initiation fee," Resnick and Zeckhauser refer
metaphorically to the notion that eBay users should be willing to post
negative commentary more frequently as to inexperienced than
experienced participants; the lower prices that inexperienced sellers
suffer count as their initiation into eBay.
Their data support the notion that buyers place incoming sellers
on probation while they build a reputable feedback score. Resnick
and Zeckhauser report that experienced sellers are less likely to
receive negative feedback than inexperienced ones.75 Specifically,
sellers with fewer than 10 positive feedbacks received negative or
neutral feedback 2.83% of the time, while .95% sellers with between
50-199 positive feedbacks received negative or neutral comments and
76
.79% of the sellers with between 200-999 positive feedbacks.
Curiously, Resnick and Zeckhauser report that the most experienced
sellers, those with more than 1000 positive feedback units, received
more negative commentary than those with scores between 50 and
999; nearly 1.2%
of the 1000 sellers received negative or neutral
77
commentary.
Gillette makes much of this "hook-shaped curve" in Resnick and
Zeckhauser's data, and argues that the data indicate that "some actors
who perform in a manner that generates a relatively significant
number ofnegative ratings continue to survive in the marketplace. 78
While the claim that buyers put inexperienced sellers on probation
would be cleaner if the data did not turn in the way that they do, the
data are not as devastating as Gillette suggests. Presumably, the
jump in the percentage of problematic commentary lodged against
74. Resnick & Zeckhauser, supranote 13, at 4 ("Ifunreliable sellers know that
they will have to pay their dues at the outset, and if they believe that the feedback

system is likely to give them poor ratings, they will be deterred from participating.
They will not make the investment of entering in the first place.").
75. Resnick & Zeckhauser, supra note 13, at 12-15. Moreover, Resnick and
Zeckhauser report that sellers are far more experienced than buyers on the average.
Id. at5.

76. Id. at 12.
77. Id.at 12-13. Moreover, they report that this figure still exceeds 1%when
an outlier isremoved from the database.
78. Gillette, supranote 8, at 1181.
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participants with an excess of 1,000 positive feedback remarks
derives more from the substantially smaller sample size ofthis most
experienced group than from anything else. For example, only 122
sellers and 15 buyers fell into the 1000 category as compared to
3,728 sellers and 3,678 buyers falling into the 50-199 positive
category.79
The presence of initiation fees is alone insufficient to ensure a
working reputation system according to Resnick and Zeckhauser.
They argue the system also should permit users to "stone" bad
behavior, bywhich they mean that eBay users should be more willing
to post negative commentary as to participants who have already
received negative commentary than participants who have not. '
Faced with the prospect of stoning, disreputable sellers cannot expect
to exploit the market for very long before getting drummed out ofthe
auction."' Resnick and Zeckhauser do not provide empirical support
for the theory that stoning occurs on eBay's feedback forum, stating
only that "[f]uture empirical work will examine the frequency of
negative feedback after a range of feedback profiles, and the
likelihood of being driven quickly from the market. 82 Nonetheless,
they argue that stoning should be reserved for intentional and
material infractions, 3 and, as noted above, their data demonstrate that
negative feedback generally is reserved for serious infractions, such
as failing to follow through on a sale or, worse yet, failing to deliver
an item although payment was received. 4
Gillette doubts the accuracy and efficacy of stoning and argues
that it is just as likely that some of the buyers who post negative
remarks about their seller are engaging in herd behavior.8 ' Following
the herd, buyers would mimic earlier negative commentary rather
than accurately report misbehavior, according to Gillette. 6 With this
79. Resnick & Zeckhauser, supra note 13, at 13, Table 3.

80. Id. at 22 ("Once one has a black mark by one's name, others may be much
more willing, indeed, eager, to cast stones.").
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. ("Ifthe goal is to deter bad apples from playing in this market, it would
be desirable if stoning were reserved for behaviors that are deliberate rather than
merely careless, and where the perpetrator benefits significantly from the action that

led to an unsatisfactory transaction.").
84. See text associated with supranote 43. See also Resnick & Zeckhauser,

supra note 13, at 11.
85. Gillette, supra note 8, at 1191 ("But it is also possible that they are
engaging in behavior that allows them to perceive slight nonconformities in the

transactions as indications of the kind of bad faith that would lead the poster to
overcome the resistance to posting, but that does not convey any additional
information about the expected level of performance by the target of the
feedback.").
86. Id.
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argument, Gillette focuses on the precision of the reputation
information in stones cast upon commercial pariahs. But in doing so,
he misses the deterrence of stoning which is enhanced by precisely
the sort of herd behavior that he criticizes. If some participants
blindly stone the recipients of negative commentary, ex ante, sellers
should do all they can to avoid even a single episode of negative
feedback. Stoning may be unjust, but its deterrent effect is
undeniably powerful.
III.
Gillette questions the reliability of feedback forums on a more
basic level when he contends that the relationship between feedback
scores and price may rest on faith alone: "successful bidders might
have believed that Feedback Forum ratings conveyed valuable
information, even though that was not the case. .. ."7 Resnick and
Zeckhauser agree that correlations between eBay reputation scores
and online auction activity may only reflect users' perceptions about
the reliability of the information posted on a feedback forum.88 They
argue, however, that the perception that reputation sanctions will be
imposed 89is all that is required for the system to deter disreputable
conduct.
When first considered, it is easy to dismiss the notion that, for a
reputation system, perception is as important as reality. Surely,
Resnick and Zeckhauser are only right about the importance ofusers'
perceptions in the short term. In the long term, we would expect
sellers to "learn" that their prospects of being "stoned" are relatively
minor and, thus, alter their perceptions of the reputation system
offered by eBay. Resnick and Zeckhauser seem to agree that users'
perceptions could change over time, but "suspect that few
participants have conducted even cursory versions of the types of
analyses conducted" in their paper ° With this remark, they
underestimate the power of the Internet, where they posted their
paper. If I can find their research by inputting the terms "eBay" and
"trust" into www.Google.com, so can anyone else.
The concern, implicit in Gillette's complaint, is that overly
trusting eBay participants, lured by the novelty of electronic
87.
88.

Gillette, supra note 8, at 1189 (emphasis added).
Resnick & Zeckhauser, supranote 13, at 3.

89. Id. at 23 ("Thus, if sellers believe poor behavior will elicit negative
feedback, and that buyers depend strongly on reputations, then sellers will behave
well and bad sellers will be deterred. It is the perception of how the system
operates, not the facts, that matters.").
90. Id.
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commerce and the overwhelmingly positive commentary posted on
the feedback forum, engage in electronic commerce that they later
regret (or should regret). Should participants trust a reputation
system despite their inability to verify the accuracy of the
information it disseminates? What role should participants'
perceptions play in assessing the effectiveness of a reputation
system?
The answer to these questions depends on the goals of the
reputation system and the nature of the information available through
that system. Users' perceptions of a system take on a different
significance when it seeks to deter fraud and nonperformance, to
communicate traders' satisfaction or dissatisfaction with earlier
commercial conduct, or, more broadly, to encourage trade. Here, I
distinguish among reputation systems that report, evaluate, and
develop reputation information.
Reporting intermediaries disseminate information regarding
violations ofcommercial trust (such as a bounced check, insufficient
funds in a bank account, or the failure to honor a letter of credit). For
example, debit, credit, and check cashing cards report a holder's
financial reputation to retailers with the aid of information
technology. The accuracy or inaccuracy of this objective information
is, by its nature, fairly easy to verify. The simplicity and objectivity
of the reputation information reported on reduces the sanction costs,
thus, enhancing the deterrent effect of the report and the likelihood
that the disreputable conduct will be punished.9 Where a reputation
system looks to deter nonperformance, fraudulent or otherwise, it is
often sufficiently effective for the intermediary to report on traders'
good or bad conduct without providing additional analysis of the
information.
Reporting intermediaries build commercial trust if they can
reliably enable traders to sanction and, therefore, deter flagrantly
opportunistic conduct. Deterrence does not require sanctions to be
imposed upon every infraction in order to succeed; commercial trust
can be built although intermediaries sanction only a fraction of those
who "cross the line." Traders will be deterred from engaging in
disreputable commercial conduct so long as there is a probability that
they will be sanctioned and the magnitude of the sanction outweighs
the expected value of the sanctionable conduct. In this way, it should
not matter that eBay's feedback forum does not sanction every
participant who engages in commercially disreputable conduct in
their auction. As long as a fraction of them are sanctioned, the
system should deter shirking. Informal mechanisms for selfregulation, such as the imposition of initiation fees and the practice
91.

Mann, Information Technology, supranote 2, at 1636.
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of stoning, also impact upon participants' perceptions of the
effectiveness of the reputation system. These informal mechanisms
affect both the probability that sanctions will be imposed, and the
severity of those sanctions. Where the reputation system looks to
deter fraud, nonperformance and the like, Resnick and Zeckhauser
are correct when they claim that participants' perceptions of the
system are as important as its actual success rate. The mere
perception that disreputable conduct will be sanctioned has a
deterrent effect on participants' online misconduct.
Evaluative intermediaries function differently. More than simply
reporting on traders' nonperformance, they disseminate information
regarding traders' satisfactory performance in the marketplace.
Examples of evaluating intermediaries abound: Zagat's evaluates
restaurants; Consumer Reports assess the quality of thousands of
different household products and services; Car & Driver ranks
automotive performance; U.S. News & World Report ranks colleges
and graduate schools, including law schools; Dunn & Bradstreet,
TransUnion and Fair Isaac & Co. provide credit rating, credit
reporting, and credit scoring evaluations. Analysis and evaluation are
essential if the goal of the reputation system is to convey detailed
information regarding satisfaction with past practices.
Questions of satisfaction concern issues of quality, value, and
condition; thus, by its nature, information regarding customer
satisfaction is subjective and hard to verify. In some instances,
evaluative criteria constitute proprietary information, and this further
complicates the task of confirming the reliability of a reputation
intermediary's evaluation. But verification may be less important to
an evaluative system. When reputation intermediaries evaluate
commercial quality, they offer their judgment as experts in the field.
Trust in evaluative reputation information does not depend on users'
abilities to confirm the accuracy of the data on which the evaluation
was based. Issues ofquality and the like involve subjective questions
on which reasonable minds can differ. Instead, trust in the evaluative
intermediary turns on a perception that the intermediary's judgment
is honest, objective, consistent, and based on reasonable criteria.
Evaluative reputation systems build commercial trust, even though
the accuracy of the information they provide to the marketplace
cannot easily be confirmed and even though dissatisfied users cannot
directly impose reputation sanctions. The primary sanction against
evaluative intermediaries with whom users disagree is to fail to
follow
their advice in future transactions.
Reputation
systems may also attempt to develop commercial
reputation and trust. Here, intermediaries are less important because
traders often signal reputation information about themselves. For
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example, branding can provide useful information to potential trading
partners about quality, taste, value, and customer satisfaction.
Advertising and other marketing techniques also look to convey
subjective assessments regarding commercial reputation. As with an
evaluative system, the information conveyed through these sorts of
marketing techniques is subjective and impossible to verify.
Perception is everything; substance is nearly irrelevant.
Is eBay a reporting or evaluative intermediary? Or is it a
marketing tool for encouraging trust in their online auction?
When negative feedback comments on a participant's
nonperformance or fraud, the feedback forum performs a reporting
function. Reputation information regarding nonperformance is
simple, objective and fairly easily verified. For all the reasons
spelled out by Resnick and Zeckhauser, the feedback forum works
well enough to deter this sort of commercial misconduct, although it
undoubtedly does not report every instance in which a seller fails to
ship the good to a buyer who has paid.
Does eBay do no more than report reputation information? Does
it perform no evaluative function with its feedback forum? Careful
to protect its passive role as an interactive computer service provider,
eBay would be loathe to characterize itselfas the source ofevaluative
reputation information.92 It describes itself as providing a forum for
users to share opinions and information about their eBay experiences,
but, in its online tutorial for its feedback forum, is careful to note that
it "will not censor these opinions, or investigate the remarks for
accuracy."93
Nonetheless, eBay encourages its users to post
feedback about all aspects of their online auction experiences,
suggesting that users report on whether their trading partner has
performed satisfactorily, not simply to report on whether their partner
has failed to perform. In this way, the feedback forum might also be
understood to perform an evaluative function. Large feedback
scores, cumulating neutral or even qualified positive commentary,
connote objective and subjective information regarding a trader. The
comments supporting these scores provide participants with
additional subjective information. Gillette criticizes the feedback
forum for providing insufficiently detailed information about online
trading experiences, but eBay has little incentive to encourage
"mildly dissatisfied" buyers to post more subjective information.
92. See The Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1995). See

also, e.g., Zeran v. American Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (1997); Blumenthal v.
Drudge, 992 F.Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998).
93. See http://pages.ebay.com/help/community/fbremove.html.

94. Resnick & Zeckhauser, supra note 13, at 23-24 ("It would help buyers to
differentiate among sellers, perhaps creating greater faith in the effectiveness ofthe
feedback system. On the other hand, making dissatisfaction more visible might

2002]

SUSAN BLOCK-LIEB

1219

More information might muddy up the feedback forum without
increasing users' participation in eBay.
Even if the feedback forum fails as an evaluative reporting
institution, it may still succeed as a marketing tool. eBay, and not a
third party intermediary, provides the feedback forum for its users.
It also provides users with an online dispute resolution mechanism,
an escrow service, and privacy protections. Together this suite of
online services is intended to build confidence and trust in its online
auction house. eBay has carefully marketed itself as trustworthy,
whereas other websites build their reputations on those ofthird-party
reputation intermediaries such as www.squaretrade.com,
www.BBBonline.com, and www.ombuds.org.
CONCLUSION

The eBay feedback forum provides a useful and important
opportunity to study a reputation system and assess its success in
building trust in electronic commerce.
Questioning other
commentators' optimism about the effectiveness of this reputation
system, Gillette fears that the feedback posted by eBay users may be
skewed against negative and neutral commentary and, therefore, is
unreliable.
If the feedback forum under-reports traders'
dissatisfaction, as Gillette claims, then he is right to question whether
it can substitute for contractual enforcement ofelectronic commerce.
Nonetheless, even an imperfect feedback forum may succeed in
deterring fraud in online auctions. Deterrence is aided where the
reputation system imposes an initiation feed on newcomers and
facilitates the stoning of traders who have failed to perform in the
past. An imperfect feedback forum may also succeed in encouraging
users to engage in commerce over the Internet by permitting eBay to
develop its reputation as a trustworthy intermediary.

destroy people's overall faith in eBay as a generally safe marketplace.").

